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The International Security Engagement of 
the European Union – Courage and  
Capabilities for a ”More Active“ EU 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Strategic Forum – Constructing a 
Common Security Culture in Europe  
 
The European Security Strategy of 2003 calls for an 
active, capable and coherent EU security policy and for 
a common ‘strategic culture’ in Europe. Since then 
much progress has been achieved, particularly with re-
gard to the institutions and capabilities of European 
security policy. Yet the construction of a common se-
curity culture remains a critical challenge. Too often 
the EU is hampered by a lack of strategic consensus 
between Member States on where, how, when and for 
what reasons the EU should engage in security opera-
tions. 
 
The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, one of the leading 
political foundations in Europe, has long been at the 
forefront of progressive debate in European foreign 
and security policy. Within its wide array of activities 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has created a new flag-
ship event to promote a common strategic culture and 
innovative thinking in European security policy: the 
bìêçéÉ~å=píê~íÉÖáÅ=cçêìã.  
 
The European Strategic Forum is an exclusive high-
level roundtable that brings together parliamentarians, 
government officials and experts from the Member 
States and the EU to discuss the future of European 
security policy. The objective of the Forum is to build a 
security policy network in which progressive voices 
from new and old Member States meet and examine 
security concepts and policies for Europe.  
The European Strategic Forum, Warsaw,  
14 September 2006 
On 14 September 2006, the first European Strategic 
Forum was held at Warsaw on ‘The International Secu-
rity Engagement of the European Union – Lessons 
Learned and Challenges Ahead’. The EU’s international 
security engagement is increasing rapidly, with new 
missions reaching from the military operation in  
DR Congo to the monitoring mission in Aceh, Indone-
sia. However, the strategic and political purpose of 
European security policy remains rather vague. Though 
the European Security Strategy constituted an impor-
tant step forward in framing a common approach to 
security, it offers, as some participants highlighted, 
more general principles than a real strategy for action. 
Furthermore, the political will in Europe to engage in 
security operations abroad seems to be rather on the 
decline as fears of military and political overstretch and 
doubts about mission success are growing. Therefore, 
strengthening the strategic and political focus in 
Europe’s security policy is both a key lesson learned 
and an important challenge ahead for the EU. 
 
Exploring the cases of EU engagement in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Sudan and Belarus the debate at 
Warsaw centred specifically on two themes: Partner-
ship and Prevention. Working in partnership is a key 
component of the European approach to security, and 
an important means of advancing the EU concept of 
‘effective multilateralism’. Yet choosing the right part-
ners – on a local as well as the international level –  
remains a demanding task. Participants at Warsaw 
pointed out that in security policy, partnerships should 
be built for the long term. In operational practise, 
however, partners are often selected on the basis of 
short-term benefits, without taking into account the 
implications of these partnerships for the long-term 
process of stabilisation and peace building in the re-
gion.  
 
Within the European approach to security, preven-
tion is a clear priority. However, participants acknow-
ledged that present EU structures, particularly the in-
tergovernmental mode of decision-making in ESDP, is 
not conducive to the implementation of pro-active, 
preventive security policies. Besides, in political terms 
prevention is rather difficult to ‘sell’, as its success, the 
non-occurrence of crisis, often remains unappreciated 
in the political and public realm.  
 
To move from reactive to pro-active security policies 
remains a key challenge for the EU. But only by force-
fully pursuing this strategic shift will Europe be able to 
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focus ~åÇ=strengthen its international security en-
gagement. In the following text, Sven Biscop, partici-
pant in the European Strategic Forum and Senior Re-
search Fellow at the Royal Institute for International 
Relations in Brussels, explores ways and means of 
meeting the challenge of a ‘more active’ EU.  
 
    píÉÑ~åáÉ=cäÉÅÜíåÉê=
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Sven Biscop * 
 
Courage and Capabilities for a “More  
Active” EU 
 
In 2003 the EU adopted the European Security Strat-
egy, the first ever strategic document providing long-
term guidance for the whole of EU foreign policy. The 
Strategy calls for the EU to be ‘ãçêÉ=~ÅíáîÉ’ in pursuing 
its strategic objectives, through a ÜçäáëíáÅ approach  
utilising ‘the full spectrum of instruments for crisis 
management and conflict prevention, including politi-
cal, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and devel-
opment activities’. ‘Spreading good governance, sup-
porting social and political reform, dealing with corrup-
tion and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law 
and protecting human rights’ should produce ‘a world 
of well-governed democratic states’. This overall 
method and objective can be described as ‘ÉÑÑÉÅíáîÉ=
ãìäíáä~íÉê~äáëã’. *
 
And active the EU has become. In late 2006, no less 
than 11 civilian and military crisis management opera-
tions are ongoing within the framework of the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) across the 
globe, including the Balkans, Palestine, Sudan, DR 
Congo and Aceh. Together, these involve about 8,000 
troops and 500 civilians. Many more troops from EU 
Member States, up to 80,000 in total, are deployed in 
other frameworks, notably in Lebanon, where the EU 
has taken the lead in providing troops for a reinforced 
UNIFIL; in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghani-
stan; and, still, in Iraq. In terms of preventive diplo-
macy, the ‘EU-3’ (France, Germany and the UK) are 
leading negotiations on nuclear proliferation with Iran. 
The EU with its Member States is already a global secu-
rity actor to be reckoned with, much more so than 
many people realize.  
 
Yet this ‘activeness’ also raises a number of ques-
tions. Why is the EU active in these cases and not in 
others? Which criteria determine ïÜÉå and ïÜÉêÉ the 
EU as such engages in crisis management, militarily 
and diplomatically? And must not the EU look ÄÉóçåÇ 
crisis management and become ‘more active’ in its 
day-to-day policies as well?  
3 
                       
*  Senior Research Fellow at the Egmont Royal Institute for  
International Relations in Brussels and Professor of European 
Security at Ghent University. In 2005 he published qÜÉ=bìêçJ
éÉ~å=pÉÅìêáíó=píê~íÉÖó=Ó=^=däçÄ~ä=^ÖÉåÇ~=Ñçê=mçëáíáîÉ=mçïÉê 
(Ashgate). 
 
Global Crisis Management  
The Strategy states unequivocally: ‘As a union of 25 
states with over 450 million people producing a  
quarter of the world’s Gross National Product […] the 
European Union is inevitably a global player’. Not only 
is it the duty of the EU, given its weight, to ‘share in 
the responsibility for global security and in building a 
better world’, but the view of the EU as just a regional 
actor ignores the dynamics of an interdependent glob-
alized world, in which ultimately Europe can be secure 
only if the world is secure. Furthermore, for multilater-
alism to be effective, it must be enforceable: ‘We want 
international organisations, regimes and treaties to be 
effective in confronting threats to international peace 
and security, and must therefore be ready to act when 
their rules are broken’.  
 
But if the EU is very active in crisis management and 
preventive diplomacy, and puts great emphasis on the 
central role of and need to support the UN Security 
Council, it does not always behave as a ÖäçÄ~ä actor.  
 
tÜÉêÉ: The Member States are certainly not averse 
to deploying their forces, but the large majority are 
deployed in the Balkans, in Europe’s backyard where 
the EU and its Member States logically assume respon-
sibility, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a follow-up to 
the interventions – one rather more controversial than 
the other – initiated by the US and a number of EU 
Member States. The large contingent in Lebanon pro-
vides an enormous opportunity to increase the EU’s 
standing in the Middle East, if the diplomatic follow-up 
is assured. But it contrasts sharply with the 1,000 
troops of EUFOR RDC reluctantly deployed in DR 
Congo, a country the size of Western Europe and with 
little or no infrastructure which it could not seriously 
hope to cover. In reality, therefore, in case of serious 
trouble EUFOR RDC would look more like a classic 
evacuation operation, ready to take out European citi-
zens in case of trouble. The same reluctance applies to 
Darfur: only after the African Union took on the opera-
tion did the reluctance to intervene give way to intense 
EU–NATO competition to gain visibility through sec-
ond-line support for the AU. Contributions to UN op-
erations, Lebanon aside, are minimal: in mid-2006 the 
EU-25 accounted for only about 2,750 out of over 
63,000 ‘blue helmets’, just 4.4%.  
 
tÜÉå: Although most Member States do put their 
forces in harm’s way in national, NATO or coalition-of-
the-willing operations, and although legally the Peters-
berg Tasks include operations at the high end of the 
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spectrum of violence, politically the Member States are 
still extremely divided over the EU’s ambition in this 
field. As Member States remain divided, in crisis situa-
tions the EU level is more often than not out of the 
loop. Consequently, even though the EU has proven 
that it can mount high-risk operations if the political 
will is present, most EU-led operations are of lower in-
tensity and often smaller in scale. The still very young 
ESDP needs a number of successes to legitimize itself, 
hence the tendency to select operations with a large 
chance of success. To some extent therefore the criti-
cism is justified that the EU takes on important but 
mostly ‘easy’ operations, in the post-conflict phase, in 
response to the settlement of a conflict – a criticism 
which can of course be applied to the international 
community as a whole. One must thus question 
whether the Member States are willing to fully accept 
the implications of the strong EU diplomatic support 
for the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) that 
was endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in Sep-
tember 2005. R2P implies that if a state is unable or 
unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the 
perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must 
give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of 
the international community. In such cases, the Secu-
rity Council must mandate intervention, if necessary by 
military means, which by definition implies high-
intensity operations.  
 
In spite of the global ambitions expressed in the 
Strategy, Member States are thus reluctant to commit 
large numbers of troops to long-term, large-scale op-
erations outside their immediate periphery or where no 
direct strategic interests are at stake – where ‘the risks 
are too high and the stakes are too low’. There is more 
willingness to implement more specific rapid reaction 
operations, of relatively smaller scale and limited dura-
tion, but for high-intensity operations Member States 
still habitually look to other frameworks than the EU. 
Proactive – military ~åÇ diplomatic – intervention, in 
the early stages of a crisis, remains difficult to accom-
plish.  
 
It must be taken into account that in spite of the 
large overall numbers of European armed forces – the 
EU-25 have over two million men and women in uni-
form – the percentage of deployable capabilities is ac-
tually rather limited. For the EU-25 it is estimated at 
just 10%. Many issues have to be addressed: the low 
cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabili-
ties, unnecessary intra-EU duplications, the presence of 
over 400,000 quasi non-deployable conscripts, capabil-
ity gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport, 
command, control and communications), slow trans-
formation from territorial defence to expeditionary 
warfare. In view of the need for rotation only one third 
of the available forces can be deployed at any one 
time, so the EU-25 can field 70–80,000 troops. This is 
what the EU-25 effectively are doing today, so a sub-
stantial increase in deployments is only possible in the 
medium to long term, in function of the ongoing 
transformation of European armed forces.  
Permanent Prevention  
Global security depends on more than crisis manage-
ment and preventive diplomacy. In line with the holistic 
approach of the Strategy, long-term permanent pre-
vention policies seek to ~îçáÇ conflict and crisis in the 
first place.  
 
‘Effective multilateralism’ must in fact be read as a 
very éêçÖêÉëëáîÉ foreign policy agenda: ensuring that 
every individual on earth has access to the core ‘global 
public goods’:  
 
• physical security or freedom from fear;  
• economic prosperity or freedom from want;  
• political participation (democracy, respect for  
human rights, the rule of law);  
• social well-being (access to health care, education    
and a clean and hazard-free environment).  
 
To these four ‘goods’, ÉîÉêóçåÉ is indeed entitled – 
hence they are ‘global’ or ‘universal’ – and it is the re-
sponsibility of the public authorities to make sure  
everyone effectively has access to them – hence they 
are ‘public’.  
 
In this regard too the EU is very active, notably in its 
bilateral relations with third countries, via the method 
of ‘positive conditionality’. Through policy frameworks 
such as the European Neighbourhood Policy vis-à-vis its 
neighbouring countries and the Cotonou Agreement 
vis-à-vis the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, 
the EU is putting the holistic approach into practice. By 
linking them to market access and economic and  
financial support, the EU aims to stimulate economic, 
political and social reforms, as well as security coopera-
tion, so as to address the root causes and durably 
change the environment that leads to extremism, crisis 
and conflict. When fully implemented, ‘positive condi-
Internationale Politikanalyse 
International Policy Analysis Unit 
 
tionality’ thus is a very intrusive approach, aiming in 
effect to export the EU’s own societal model, but 
based on persuasion rather than coercion.  
 
But if ‘positive conditionality’ as a theory seems 
sound enough, practice often lags behind, certainly in 
countries that do not – immediately – qualify for EU 
membership. The carrots that would potentially be 
most effective in stimulating reform, such as opening 
up the European agricultural market or setting up a 
system for legal economic migration, are those that 
the EU is not willing to consider, in spite of imperative 
arguments suggesting that Europe actually needs such 
measures. At the same time, conditionality is seldom 
applied very strictly. The impression created is that the 
EU favours stability and economic – and energy – in-
terests over reform, to the detriment of Europe’s ‘soft 
power’. Surprisingly perhaps, in the Mediterranean 
neighbours, for example, public opinion mostly views 
the EU as a status quo actor, working with current re-
gimes rather than promoting fundamental change, 
whereas, perhaps even more surprisingly after the in-
vasion of Iraq, the United States is seen as caring more 
sincerely about democracy and human rights.  
 
This lack of EU soft power should not be underesti-
mated. Rather than the benign, multilateralist actor 
which the EU considers itself – ‘the one that did not 
invade Iraq’ – in many Southern countries it is first and 
foremost seen as a very aggressive economic actor. For 
many countries, the negative economic consequences 
of dumping and protectionism – which often cancel 
out the positive effects of development aid – are far 
more important and threatening than the challenges 
of terrorism and proliferation that dominate the West-
ern foreign policy agenda, and therefore determine the 
image of the EU far more. In the current difficult inter-
national climate, the EU model is urgently in need of 
enhancing its legitimacy.  
Conclusion: More Active – Less Divided  
In the European Security Strategy, the EU has adopted 
a very progressive foreign policy concept. The empha-
sis on partnership and prevention through working 
jointly for enhanced access to the core ‘global public 
goods’ offers an alternative ‘European way’ in contrast 
to other, more unilateralist and military approaches. 
The Strategy thus offers both a sound concept and an 
ambitious agenda, which is still valid and therefore 
does not have to be updated. But the EU must indeed 
become ãçêÉ=~ÅíáîÉ in fully and sincerely implement-
ing it. This requires both more political courage and 
more, as well as better capabilities.  
 
1. There are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for 
the EU to deal effectively with all of them, certainly 
in a leading role. Prioritisation is therefore inevita-
ble. Two sets of criteria seem to determine when 
and where the EU must lead, or make a substantial 
contribution to, diplomatic and military intervention, 
up to and including the use of force, if necessary 
and mandated by the Security Council. The inter-
vention must be éêç~ÅíáîÉ – the EU should be a true 
éÉ~ÅÉã~âÉê. On the one hand, if anywhere in the 
world the threshold for activating the R2P mecha-
nism is reached, the EU, in view of its support for 
the principle, should muster the Åçìê~ÖÉ to contrib-
ute to its implementation. On the other hand, the 
EU must also contribute to the resolution of con-
flicts and crises that are of real strategic importance 
for Europe or, as the EU is a global actor, for the 
world. This would certainly include the Balkans, the 
Middle East and the Gulf, but a debate seems in or-
der to further clarify these strategic interests. What 
would Europe’s role be in case of conflict in North 
Korea, or in the Caucasus, or if vital energy supplies 
were cut off?  
 
5 
2. At the same time, the collective security system of 
the UN, and therefore the EU itself, as its main sup-
porter and with two permanent members of the Se-
curity Council in its ranks, can be legitimate only if it 
addresses the threats to ÉîÉêóçåÉÛë security. Too 
much selectivity undermines the system. Although it 
cannot always play a leading role, the EU must 
shoulder a significant share of the responsibility for 
global peace and security by playing an active role 
in the Security Council ~åÇ by contributing capabili-
ties to UN crisis management and peacekeeping 
operations, either as UN-led blue helmets or on 
‘sub-contracted’ EU-led missions. If automaticity of 
availability of troops is difficult, a political decision 
could be made on the order of magnitude of a rea-
sonable European contribution, in function of which 
the EU can then act as a ‘clearing house’ for Mem-
ber States’ contributions. If the commitment in 
Lebanon is a positive example, the current contribu-
tion of less than 3,000 blue helmets for the rest of 
the world, and two Battlegroups on stand-by for 
operations primarily – but not exclusively – at the 
request of the UN, means that the EU is punching 
below its weight.  
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3. All of these commitments require ÇÉéäçó~ÄäÉ mili-
tary capabilities that the EU is currently lacking. EU 
Member States should abandon the national focus 
that still drives them to strive after full capacity at 
the national level. Rather than at the level of each 
individual Member State, the EU-25 together must 
become capable. In fact, a wider political decision is 
in order, translating the European Security Strategy 
into a military level of ambition based on the full 
military potential of all Member States: how many 
forces should the EU-25 be able to muster for crisis 
management, as well as for long-term peacekeep-
ing; what reserves does this require; and what ca-
pacity must be maintained for territorial defence? 
Within that framework, éççäáåÖ, by reducing intra-
European duplications, can produce much more de-
ployable capabilities within the current combined 
defence budget.  
 
4. The EU must also muster the Åçìê~ÖÉ to effectively 
apply conditionality. Admittedly, ‘positive condition-
ality’ requires an extremely difficult balancing act, 
especially vis-à-vis countries with authoritarian re-
gimes and great powers like Russia and China: 
maintaining partnership and being sufficiently criti-
cal at the same time. But in that difficult context, 
the EU should show more consistency and resolve in 
reacting to human rights abuses, which should visi-
bly impact on the relationship with any regime.  
A much enhanced image and increased legitimacy 
will follow, notably in the eyes of public opinion, 
which is a prerequisite for the gradual pursuit of 
further-reaching political, economic and social re-
forms. But has the EU really solved the dilemma of 
stability versus democracy? A debate also seems in 
order on desired end-states, especially of the 
Neighbourhood Policy. Is our aim incremental pro-
gress while maintaining existing regimes, or full 
democratization – and if the latter, are our instru-
ments sufficient to achieve that goal?  
 
5. More generally, the progressive agenda of the 
European Security Strategy risks losing credibility if 
the EU does not draw the full conclusions from it, 
notably for its international trade policies. If an ex-
clusive focus on hard security undermines the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of a policy, so does a one-
dimensional focus on trade, without a link to the 
political and social (including ecological) dimensions. 
Rethinking trade and agricultural policies – and mi-
gration policy – again demands leaders with enough 
political courage to further the EU project against 
certain established interests.  
 
6. Implementing the holistic approach requires the ac-
tive cooperation of all global powers. The UN collec-
tive security system can work only if all permanent 
members actively subscribe to it and refrain from 
paralysing or bypassing the Security Council. Condi-
tionality can work only if it is not undermined by ac-
tors that disregard human rights and other consid-
erations in their international relations. Another de-
bate therefore concerns how the EU can persuade 
strategic partners like Russia and China, and the US, 
that ‘effective multilateralism’ – as understood by 
the EU – is in their long-term interest. 
 
7. This holistic approach cannot be efficiently imple-
mented without changes in the EU machinery. An 
EU Foreign Minister and European External Action 
Service would allow integration of the security, po-
litical, social and economic dimensions in all foreign 
policies, from the creation to the implementation 
and evaluation of policy. An EU Foreign Minister 
with a stronger mandate would also strengthen the 
EU’s capacity for preventive diplomacy.  
 
8. Finally, the European Security Strategy can only 
move from a concept to consistent and resolute ac-
tion if the EU acts as one. As long as the EU remains 
divided between ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’, 
neither the EU nor NATO can be effective actors. 
Only a united EU has the weight to deal with the 
challenges of the globalized world and become a 
consistent and decisive actor, in an equal partner-
ship with the United States.  
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n 2003, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy, the first ever  
strategic document providing long-term guidance for the whole of EU  
foreign policy. The Strategy calls for the EU to be ‘more active’ in pursuing 
its strategic objectives, through a holistic approach utilising ‘the full  
spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention,  
including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development 
activities’.  
 
I
And active the EU has become. In late 2006, no less than 11 civilian and 
military crisis management operations were ongoing within the framework 
of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) across the globe. Yet 
this ‘activeness’ also raises a number of questions. Why is the EU active in 
these cases and not in others? Which criteria determine when and where 
the EU as such engages in crisis management, militarily and diplomatically? 
And must not the EU look beyond crisis management and become ‘more 
active’ in its day-to-day policies as well? 
 
These questions were at the center of debate at the first European Strategic 
Forum of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Warsaw, 2006. The Forum is a 
new security policy network in which progressive voices from new and old 
Member States meet and examine security concepts and policies for Europe. 
In its report, Sven Biscop, participant in the European Strategic Forum, ad-
dresses these questions and explores ways and means of meeting the chal-
lenge of a ‘more active’ EU. 
